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TEXT OP STATUTES

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609(a) (1983) provides:

RULE 609.
OF CRIME.

IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted
if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year under the law under which
he was convicted, and the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.

STATEMENT OP ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to rule on whether

a prior felony conviction of the defendant should be allowed into
evidence until the question was asked before the jury?

2.

Did the trial court err in allowing the prior felony of

the defendant to be allowed into evidence?

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§77-35-26(2)(a)(1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal
action may take an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from a final
judgment of conviction of a Class B Misdemeanor by a Circuit Court.
In the case at hand, final judgment and conviction were rendered by
the Honorable Judge Sheila K. McCleve, Third Circuit Court, Salt
Lake Department, Salt Lake County, Utah.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OP THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff
V.

Case No. 880550-CA
Priority No. 2

GLEN C. SNYDER,
Defendant

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

GLEN C. SNYDER appeals from judgment and conviction for
Destruction of Property, a Class B Misdemeanor, in the Third Circuit
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Sheila K.
McCleve, Judge, presiding.

The matter was tried to a four member

jury; the jury convicted Mr. Snyder as charged.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The incident charged in the present case occurred in the
late evening of April 2nd, 1988. Dallas Mullins and a friend, James
Vansickle, were parked at approximately 10th South and State Street,
Salt Lake City in front of the AudioTech store.

The two youths had

been on State Street that evening for about three hours. While they
were parked, a black Cobra Mustang pulled diagonally in front of
Dallas Mullins* car (T 5).

Dallas Mullins testified at trial that

Glen Snyder, the defendant, got out of the Mustang and ran toward

the victim's car and tried the door handle but the door had been
locked.

When the door wouldn't openf the assailant kicked the

passenger door window.

Dallas Mullins tried backing the car, but

almost hit a fire hydrant.

The assailant came back with a baseball

bat and hit the windshield (T 5).

The windshield glass was

fractured showering glass on James Vansickle, who was seated in the
passenger seat (T 8).

On cross-examination, Dallas Mullins stated

that the entire incident took about a minute (T 11) and that he did
not know who Glen Snyder, the defendant, was prior to his being
shown Glen Snyder's driver's license picture by police officers and
that the only times that Dallas Mullins had ever seen the defendant
was when Dallas Mullins thought Mr. Snyder broke his windshield with
a baseball bat, and in court at the day of the trial.
Mr. Snyder took the stand in his own defense and stated
that he had used his brother's car earlier that day but denied being
involved in any vandalism (T 15). On cross-examination by the
prosecution, Mr. Snyder claimed he was in his room at the Carlton
Hotel until past 1:00 a.m. on the morning after the evening of the
windshield incident (T 17).
The prosecution called the passenger of the car, James
VanSickle, as a rebuttal witness who corroborated Dallas Mullins'
testimony and identified Mr. Snyder in court as the perpetrator of
the car vandalism (T 23).
After hearing testimony and additional evidence, the trial
court found Mr. Snyder guilty of Destruction of Property, a Class B
Misdemeanor.

Mr. Snyder was sentenced to six months jail with
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credit for time served on a felony parole revocation and was ordered
to pay $214.78 restitution on the broken windshield.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to
rule prior to trial on the defendant's motion whether prior criminal
convictions of the defendant should be allowed into evidence or
excluded until the question was asked before the jury.

The first

question asked by the prosecutor of the defendant in
cross-examination was "Sir, have you ever been convicted of a
felony?" to which the defendant responded, "yes".

This is a case of

witness identification and the admission to the jury of a felony
record by the defendant was clearly prejudicial to his credibility
and his claim that he was not the perpetrator of the crime.
The trial court should not have allowed the prior felony of
the defendant into evidence without the prosecution having met its
burden of establishing that the prior conviction was more probative
than prejudicial.
Because the jury believed the prior felony conviction of
the defendant was admissible for substantive purposes, the jury must
have taken it into account in reaching its decision.

The

overwhelming prejudicial effect of such information suggests the
outcome would have been different had the question of a prior felony
conviction not been asked.

ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
RULE ON WHETHER THE PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD OF THE
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED INTO EVIDENCE OR
EXCLUDED UNTIL THE QUESTION WAS ASKED BEFORE THE
JURY,
Prior to trial, defense counsel motioned that the criminal
record of the defendant be excluded from being admitted into
evidence (T 1).

The prosecution argued that the motion was "very

premature and until that time arises, I don't think the court can
make a ruling on it." (T 1).

The court ruled that "if they start to

testify that way, object that it's not responsive and I"11 sustain
the objection, if they testify to anything that shouldn't be
admitted." (T 2 ) .
The first question asked by the prosecution of the
defendant in cross examination was, "Sir, have you ever been
convicted of a felony?" to which the defendant answered, "yes". (T
16).

Review of the actual tape of the trial will reveal that the

prosecutor took a poignant pause before proceeding with the
remainder of his cross-examination.

The trial court's non-decisive

ruling on defendant's motion to exclude left the door open for the
prosecution to ask the very incriminating question of a felony
conviction in front of the jury which was exploited by the
prosecution in closing argument.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor recapped the city's
witnesses' testimonies and then stated, "We therefore have the
defendant take the stand and tell us his story.

Now, the defendant

tells us that, one; hefs a convicted felon and two; that he never
really left the Carlton that whole night except for just a couple of
minutes."

(Addendum 2)

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
PRIOR FELONY OP THE DEFENDANT TO BE ALLOWED INTO
EVIDENCE.
Rule 609(a)(1) (Utah R. Evid. 609, 1983) mandates that an
accused who testifies in a criminal case on his own behalf can be
impeached by evidence of his prior felony convictions not involving
dishonesty or false statement only if the court determines that the
probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect (as cited in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986)).
The Utah Supreme Court in Banner further outlined five of the
factors to be considered when balancing probative value against
prejudicial effect (citing 321 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Rules of Evidence
§420 (1982):
[1] The nature of the crime, as bearing on the
character for veracity of the witness.
[2] The recentness or remoteness of the prior
conviction . . .
[3] The similarity of the prior crime to the
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance may
lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad
person.
[4] The importance of credibility issues in
determining the truth in a prosecution tried
without decisive nontestimonial evidence . . .
[5] The importance of the accused testimony, as
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions
probative of the accused character for veracity.
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 at 1334 (Utah 1986).

No balancing test was ever performed by the court.

The

Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App.,
1988) held that:

"The State has the burden of establishing that the

prior conviction is more probative than prejudicial.

(Banner, 717

P.2d at 1334). . . . Therefore, because the trial court did not
utilize the Banner criteria and the probative value versus
prejudicial effect, we find that the court erred in finding the
prior conviction admissible.

State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 19 (Utah

App. 1988).
The error in Wight was found to be harmless due to the fact
that the only part of Wight's testimony which seriously conflicted
with the view of events propounded by the State was Wight's
assertion that he was only sleepy, not drunk.

That testimony was

refuted by evidence concerning his blood alcohol content.
instant case is distinguishable.

The

The facts offered by the

prosecution of the actions of Mr. Snyder were in direct conflict
with where Mr. Snyder claimed to be on April 2, 1988.
of identification.

It is a case

The admission by the defendant on

cross-examination that he was a convicted felon certainly must have
been taken into consideration by the jury in weighing his
credibility as a witness to testify in his own behalf.

Error is

reversible "only if a review of the record persuades the court that
without the error there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant.'"

State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d

1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (quoting State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635,
637 (Utah 1982) as cited in State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 19 (Utah
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App. 1988).

Had Mr. Snyder been able to testify free from the

stigma to his credibility of being asked whether he had been
convicted of a felony, there would be a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for Mr. Snyder.

In an eye witness

identification case, the credibility of the witnesses is an
important factor in the jury's determination of whether the city
has met their burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION

Glen Snyder respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand the case for a new trial or dismissal of
the charges.

Respectfully submitted this

I

day of June, 1989.

Lloyd Al Poelman
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

ADDENDUM A
CLOSING ARGUMENTS

Salt Lake City vs. Glen Snyder Tape 88-1393
Prosecution:

881003180MC

. . . destroy property, taking a baseball bat to a

windshield is about as malicious as you can get, unless it's on a
person's body.

But if you're going to destroy property, this is

what it is and this is what we're dealing with is a property
(inaudible).

And that this conduct occurred in Salt Lake City and

it occurred on or about April 2, 1988. What the defendant has put
into issue is that he is not the one, he had been mistaken for
someone else.

So that is the issue to which you must resolve and

basically comes down to the sole issue, whether or not this person
is the one who did it or did not do it.

That takes us to the

reasonable doubt instruction and also takes us to the instruction of
someone who has knowingly testified falsely.

Because the reasonable

doubt of this is you've got one of two stories. You either believe
the story that the two young men have told you in regards to what
has taken place and their identification of this individual or you
say we don't believe them, we believe the defendant and that he was
not there at the time.

So what it comes down to is one of two

stories, and that's how really the reasonable doubt of this matter
is to be viewed.

Take one of two stories and say I either believe

it or don't believe it and it's (inaudible).

Now as we've gone

through, you've heard the stories and when I attempted to start, I
started with Dallas in regard to this, just basically with the

incident itself.

That's my starting point with him because the

issue that I was not there where he was at was unknown to me.
(inaudible) what we have in this particular case and describe to you
the incident.

He tells you that about the individual, that he sees

him, identifies him in the X.
occurred.

No doubt in his mind about what has

We thereafter have the defendant take the stand and tell

us his story.

Now, the defendant tells us that, one, he's a

convicted felon and two that he never really left the Carlton that
whole night except for just a couple of minutes.

Then as he's

pressed about the matter, "well didn't you go someplace else"?
"Well, yah I did leave for a few minutes".
go"?

"Well, no place, I just came back".

"Well, where did you
And his story starts

changing and it changes about 4 times as we're going through this
because, of course nothing happens, then he gets stopped for some
type of moving violation then he goes down and does not go down to
the vicinity of 550 South State, never meets with an officer, then
it changes, Oh I went down and I finally did go down and visit my
brother.

Ah, never saw a cop and then Oh yes I did see a cop and I

guess it was in that vicinity.

Ah, of course you walked from a

building, yes I did.

Then the story changes, well no I didn't I

drove out in my car.

So, the story just keeps changing and changing

and changing.

So, you're looking at this, is thia a story that I'm

going to be believing or a story I'm not going to be believing.
Then we take a few of the items that are involved here.
the defendants wallet that's in his brothers coat.
lead to surmise that some particular incident.

We've got

It would tend to

This person is into

that vehicle because his wallet is discovered in that vehicle.
- ? -

2.

You've got or he admits at one point that he walked from behind the
building where his brother has now been parked and the officer has
talked to the brother, the officer leaves. The officer waits around
for a few minutes, goes back and who does he see walking from the
building who's been hiding.

He admits that he was hiding at one

point but then he tells his brother he wasn't hiding from
destruction of this vehicle. Ah, what we surmise by this was him
very well surmised that we have a defendant who has done something,
knows that the cops are going to be looking for him and the cops to
vicinity, and thinking the cops are gone are not going to be around,
he can now come out of hiding and proceed to be on his way but yet
he is met and confronted by the officer.

The other people have

already left the scene. We know that because the identification of
the individual takes place when the wallet was discovered in the
car.

So, we have the story as it kept changing and as he kept

telling us and then after we do that we have the defendant tell us
that he's going driving around in the Ford Galaxy and he hadn't left
the car before these incidents. Now then I put on the stand, James
VanSickel who, once again without a doubt, identifies this
particular person and the identification identical is what we've had
from Mr. Moen.

The type of hair color, everything, the clothes,

that's when everything takes place.

Then we get into a neut a

little bit. A nuance which was unbeknownst to what was going on
here.

We have Mr. VanSickel who thereafter tells us the fact he had

actually seen this particular defendant driving around in a Ford
Galaxy and seeing him three times that night, not knowing that that

was anything for which (inaudible) needed to discuss with us. Not
only that, but we have Mr. VanSickel who tells us that he is
definitely going around and seen three different times on that
night.

The defendant telling us that he hadn't left the Carlton,

not at all and the defendant as it turns out drives that Ford Galaxy
that was seen.

In fact, he knows how it is because he knows the

girl that's with, though he doesn't know the defendant, he knows the
girl that was with the defendant.

So all of the City submits to you

leaves us only one conclusion and that's the fact that the story
that the defendant is telling is not credible.
and it's not the truth.

It's not believable

That the defendant, in fact, is the person

who smashed the window of this particular vehicle at that time and
that location on South State and we would ask that you find the
defendant guilty in this matter.
Judge:

Thank you very much.

Mr. Poelman.

Mr Poelman:

At the beginning of the trial I told you to listen

carefully to what the two witnesses that the city were going to call
would be saying regarding the identification of who they want to
charge with this crime.
are:

The questions I want you to ask yourself

are you convinced that the identification identifying Mr.

Snyder today or was it because they were prompted by his driver's
license being shown to him by the police officers. Also, ask
yourself if it isn't a fact that every time they've identified Mr.
Snyder, it 's been under a proceeding of either a police officer
showing the ID or him being here in court today.

They must assume

that the person who they identified originally as the right one.
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Also consider the fact that as the credibility of the testimony goes
that the fact that Mr. Snyder was confused as to the name of the
officer who pulled him over doesn't mean that he doesn't have an
accurate recollection of the fact that he did not hit the car
windshield with a baseball bat. He did say that he spoke with the
officer, that he didn't know his name and that was the new name that
he was being hit with today.

I can understand somebody not having a

recollection of that, but when he was asked directly, did you get
out of the car, did you perform this act, his answer is no. Also,
his response to the question, what was your hair like at that time,
he says slightly longer than it is now. What was the color?

Both

of the witnesses wanted to say that it's darker than it is right
now.

The recollection as to some of the details was there but some

of it wasn't.

They could remember that this person was wearing

levis, couldn't remember the color of his shirt.
remember that a shirt was being worn.

They could

Mr. Snyder's testimony fits

in that his brother did tell him when he spoke with his brother,
"watch out, the police are looking for you, you've been ID as
somebody as somebody the police are after."

But he didn't know

anything about the incident until he spoke with his brother.

He

stated that he wasn't riding around with his brother in that black
Cobra that night, that he had been in the car earlier that day, well
before one or two and that's when his wallet was left in the car.
If the wallet hadn't been found by the police and shown to the two
witnesses today, it's questionable of whether they would have been
able to identify him here today.

The burden you have is to convict

Mr. Snyder of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
of innocence.

He has a presumption

You have to weigh the evidence that's true.

I'm

suggesting to you that Mr. Snyder may have been perfect on his
recollection of all the details but he did recall the fact that he
did not pick up a baseball bat that evening and smash in a car
window.

That he's testified to.

I question also how thorough the

witnesses and how certain they could be on an incident that took
place that fast.

To believe them myself, I would have appreciated a

little more hesitancy.

For them to say, No I'm quite certain,

rather than I'm absolutely positive.

I would say, with their

(inaudible) flying, cars backing up, almost hitting fire hydrants,
windows at the sides of doors being kicked that there isn't
necessarily an ability of a person to have an absolute recollection
of what a person looks like.

I don't doubt that the witnesses

believe that it's Mr. Snyder who performed this act.

But I believe

that their testimony was refreshed in a way that wasn't accurate.
They were shown a driver's license by the police and said isn't this
the man?

They were brought into court today and said," Isn't this

the man?"

I don't doubt that they believe that this is the man, but

I don't think that the city has proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr. Snyder is that man.
Judge;

Thank you.

Mr. Ludlow.

Prosecution:

Thank you, your honor.

One of the items to which we

had here is that when the incident occurred, as they informed you,
especially Mr. VanSickel, that he had given a description to the
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officer as to who had done this particular incident.

He described

him and the police thereafter giving the ID on the Driver's license,
to which he says this is the one, that's exactly who he saw. Now
they've described it to him.

The counsel is trying to suggest that

the idea of who's doing it is being put in her mind by the officer.
It's the other way around.
it.

They're telling the officer who's doing

The officer shows them, "this is the one?"

one."

"Yes this is the

It's just the opposite of what counsel suggests. You have a

question here as to whether or not the defendant has told us the
truth, told us a credible story.

We submit that it is not the

truth, it is not a credible story.
done this particular incident.
regards to what occurred.

He is, in fact the one who has

He has been identified, positive, in

We have some people who've seen him at

night and have someone who is in the situation where they are
viewing someone who is taking a baseball bat and swinging it right
at them.

Face it, you're not going to forget.

I submit that what

has occurred here has been done by the defendant and the city
requests that you find the defendant guilty.
Judge:

Thank you very much.

Do you solemly swear that you'll take this jury to a private

and convenient place to deliberate and not allow anyone to
communicate with them, including yourself until a verdict has been
reached and then return with them when a verdict has been reached.
All rise and we'll excuse the jury.
(Jury excused).
Judge:

All right, has the, have the jurors appointed a foreman?

Juror: Yes.

Judge:

And who is that, Mre Wolf, All right and has the jury

reached a verdict?
Juror:

Yes, your honor.

Judge:

If you would, my clerk will receive that from you, she'll go

over and get that. Please hand that to her.

Mr. Poelman, let's

have you stand with the defendant, Mr. Snyder and I'll read the
verdict to you.

In the case of Salt Lake City vs. Glen C. Snyder,

we the jurors in the above case find the defendant guilty of
destruction of property.
Mr. Poelman:
Judge:

Do you wish to have the jury polled.

I would.

Then let me just go through that and ask if that is your

verdict, Mr. Wolf?
Mr. Wolf:
Judge:

Yes it is.

Mr. Sewell?

Mr. Sewell:
Judge:

Yes it was.

Mr. Jenson?

Mr. Jenson: Yes.
Judge:

Ms. Williams?

Ms. Williams: Yes.
Judge:

Alright, thank you. You may be seated counsel and we will

again thank you jurors for your attendance for your attendance here
today, the service that you've rendered, your attentiveness, and
your deliberations.

You may be excused at this time and you're free

to go if you wish or then again you can remain behind the bar.
Thank you for your service. And, Mr. Poelman, of course defendant

has the right to be sentenced at a later time or you can waive that
and I can sentence him today, whatever you prefer.
Mr. Poelman;

We would ask to be sentenced now and waive that right

to be sentenced later.
Judge:

All right, let's have him come up to the podium.

Let me ask

Mr. Ludlow first if we have an estimate on the restitution?
Mr. Ludlow:
Judge:

Yes, your honor, we do.

What, while Mr. Ludlow's looking for that.

Mr. Ludlow:

At Ray's glass, the amount of the damage is $214.78 and

at Double A Auto Glass Inc., it was $250.25. You can take the
lesser.
Judge:

$214.78, OK.

Mr. Ludlow:
Judge:

If I also, the city has . .

Sentencing recommendations?

Mr. Ludlow:

A rap sheet on the defendant.

criminal history.
Judge:

Ah . .

What's he serving time now for?

Mr. Poelman:
Judge:

He has an extensive

It's a parole violation on an escape.

What was the original?

Mr. Poelman:
Mr. Ludlow:

It was attempted burglary.
Well, he's a burglary in 6 months, he's had a theft

charge which he went for one year then escaped from the prison, then
they keep adding up.
Judge:

Did the city have a recommendation then?

Mr. Ludlow:

Your honor, we believe the defendant to be a very

dangerous destructive individual. We would ask for a maximum

sentence on this.

I usually don't ask for that, but in this

defendant's case, I would.
Judge:

Any recommendation as to . .

Mr. Ludlow:
Judge:

We would also ask for the restitution on that.

Go ahead, Mr. Poelman.

Mr. Poelman:

Mr. Snyder's does have a criminal record, he's out at

the prison, that's where he's at now. Yah, he's been serving out
there already because of this parole violation when he was arrested
for that they sent him back to the prison.

And I think he's already

basically served some time on this even though he hasn't been
sentenced yet because if it were not for this arrest that he
wouldn't have been back to the prison that he has . .
Judge:

So the arrest was the reason for the revocation?

Mr. Poelman:

of parole, that's right.

the end of Julye

He's got a parole review at

I would ask that he be given credit for some of

that time that he has already served because of his revocation on
the parole directly related to this.

Of course, we would accept the

restitution given at (inaudible)
Judge:

So we don't know how long he's going to be out to the prison

yet until he has a hearing at the end of July on the revocation?
Mr. Poelman:
Judge:

That's right.

Well, I'm concerned I guess mostly about the restitution.

If I were to give him credit for time served and allow it to run
concurrent and order the restitution, I suppose I want to have some
assurance that the restitution will be paid.
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I don't have any idea

how long hefs going to be out to the prison.

It's difficult for me

to sentence, to determine whether to sentence concurrently or
consecutively.

What's the date of the hearing out at the prison

again, July, end of July?
Mr. Poelman:
Judge:

July 20th.

And it's on a burgl. . It must be a burglary.

Mr. Poelman:

He claims that it was the escape, that his original

charge was attempted burglary but that the escape was the felony.
Judge:

I've got a conviction here for a burglary in 85 and then the

escape in 87?

Is that accurate with what he said?

Mr. Poelman: right.
Judge:

And then a Class B theft in 88.

Mr. Poelman:

Does that show a conviction on the burglary cause it

says. .
Judge:

It shows a conviction on the burglary, urn hum.

conviction.

That's not what he recalls?

Mr. Snyder:

That's not what happened at all.

It says

It was dropped in a

bargain that I plead to the attempted escape.
Mr. Ludlow:
shows

Your honor, there's another one down there further that

that there was another burglary to which there, a burglary or

a theft, there was a dismissal.
Judge:

That's right, there are a couple of burglaries.

Mr. Ludlow:

I think he's misconfusing or I should say that he is

confusing some of his other acts for the ones which he has been
found guilty.

There are two crimes to which he has on there, one is
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a theft, one of which the city reads it as being a one year
conviction on that.

The other which is a burglary for which a 6

month sentence was given for that together with his escape.
Judge:

Well, Mr, Poelman if you have some other corrections that

you want to make, I guess I could give you the time to do that and
we could have the defendant brought back out and I could sentence
him at a later time.

If you don't want to do that, I'll to ahead

and sentence now.
Mr. Poelman:

Yah, what we might recommend then would be the

sentencing could be after the 20th and then the court would know
what the parole board did and would have a better idea of knowing.
Judge:

Let me just get again for the record.

The city recommends,

with respect to sentencing, that the full 6 months be imposed, that
restitution be ordered and that the sentence be ordered, you didn't
recommend concurrent or consecutive, did you?
Mr. Ludlow:

No I did not, your honor, whatever the court feels

would be appropriate.
Judge:

OK.

Let me tell you, Mr. Poelman, I'm considering for Mr.

Snyder whether to run it consecutive or concurrently and again the
issue with the court primarily of concern if the restitution amount,
the amount of restitution to be paid.

I'll wait and see what the

parole board does and whether he's revoked and for how long he's
going to be in the state prison whether that sentence that I impose
for him after that or concurrent with it. Urn. .
Mr. Ludlow:
problem.

May the city for clarification, so we do not run into

The defendant will be waiving his time period to be
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sentenced within the 10 days.

Is that what is taking place here,

between 2 and 10 days because the 20th is going to be beyond
sentencing time.
Judge:

Yah, yah.

Mr. Poelman:
Judge:

Yah, that would be better.

Is that what he wants to do?

Mr. Poelman:
Judge:

You waived the time period and after the parole.

That's what you want to do right?

All right, I'll let him do that and set it for after the

20th and

Does he have a, was he out on probation to A.P.& P., when

he was out on parole, did he have a parole officer through A.P.& P.
or corrections or?
Mr. Poelman:

Because what I would accept is a previous ah, I'm

going to order a presentence from A.P.&P. so that I can get the
records straight and have the rap sheet and I'll just get some more
information and you can get the further information to me but we'll
get it clarified on his record.

And I would accept whatever they've

got previously with the follow-up.

So if we know who his parole

officer was, does he remember the name of his parole officer?
Mr. Ludlow:
Mr. Poelman:
Judge:

Was it Maurice Eskavar.
Maurice Eskavar.

Eskavar, all right we'll make a note that it's Eskavar that

was his parole officer previously and refer it to A.P. & P. for a
presentence report and I'll use that report with an update.

That

would be acceptable and then we'll sentence him on August 8th at, is
the afternoon easier for the prison, transport either way?
let's do it at 9:00 then.

Well

Monday, August 8th at 9:00 for sentencing.

Mr. Poelman;

Do I need to make arrangements to have him talk to his

parole officer or . . .
Judge:

We'll make a note in the referral over there but you can

follow up on that as well.

And I'll sentence him that day on the

information that I have so if there's something you want to correct
or add, have it to me by then.

That will be the order of the courtf

we'll be in recess.
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